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Globalization, Law, and the Transformation
of Sovereignty: The Emergence of Global
Regulatory Governance
KANISHKA JAYASURIYA"
INTRODUCTION: GLOBALIZATION AND LAW
Globalization is reshaping the fixed and firm boundary between domestic
and international spheres and changing our conceptions of the proper domain
of domestic and international politics and law. In reformulating the
entrenched disciplinary assumptions underlying these conceptual definitions
of the national and the international, we necessarily move the concept of
sovereignty to the foreground when analyzing the relationship between
globalization and law. There is no doubt that the process of globalization is
transforming traditional conceptions and constructions of sovereignty; the
conventional image of a sovereignty associated with exclusive territorial
jurisdiction-given the shorthand term "Westphalian" to denote the
importance of the Treaty of Westphalia in giving recognition to these kinds of
sovereignty-is no longer theoretically or empirically serviceable in the face
of the internationalization of economic and social activity.' Similarly, the
fragmentation of the State increasingly challenges the notion that within a
State, there is a form of internal sovereignty or unity around a monistic legal
order.2
International law, like international relations, relies on a political theory
of sovereignty to buttress its conceptual framework. In a sense, the concept
of sovereignty stands in much the same relation to the disciplines of
international law and international relations as does the concept of markets to
* Kanishka Jayasuriya is a Senior Research Fellow, Asia Research Centre, Murdoch University,
Western Australia.
1. John Ruggie, Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations,
47 INT'L ORG. 139, 174 (1993).
2. See Kanishka Jayasuriya, Political Economy ofDemocratisation in East Asia, 18 ASIAN PERSP.,
Fall-Winter 1994, at 141; Sol Picciotto, The Regulatory Criss-Cross: Interaction Between Jurisdictions
and the Construction of Global Regulatory Networks, in INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY COMPETITION AND
COORDINATION: PERSPECTIVE ON ECONOMIC REGULATION IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 89,92-98
(William Bratton et al. eds., 1996); Anne Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, in FOREIGN
AFFAIRS 184, 184 (1997).
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the discipline of economics. But, as with the concept of the market, the notion
of sovereignty has, until recently, not been subject to critical scrutiny in the
mainstream literature. Given the rapid globalization of the economy, the
growth of regional institutions like the European Union (EU), and the
emergence of international regulatory regimes, the conventional notion of a
sovereign State has limited efficacy. The concept of the sovereign State as an
entity that has exclusive jurisdiction over its territory (with the concomitant
limitation on external encroachment on its power), as well as the notion of an
internal sovereignty reflected in the internal unity of the State and its
"monistic" legal order, needs rethinking. The notion of a single unified
system of internal sovereignty has become increasingly problematic in a
global political economy surrounded by islands of sovereignty, rather than by
a single, central decisionmaking authority. As MacCormick remarks, in
relation to sovereignty and the EU, among other things, this means that in
order to:
[E]scape from the idea that all law must originate in a single
power source, like a sovereign, is thus to discover the
possibility of taking a broader, more diffuse, view of law.
The alternative approach is system-oriented in the sense that
it stresses the kind of normative system law is, rather than
some particular or exclusive set of power relations as
fundamental to the nature of law.'
The thrust of this Article is to explore the ramifications of this
fragmentation of sovereignty for our understanding of international law and
international relations. As will be argued later, the development of this
"complex sovereignty" reflects the transformation and reconstitution of the
notion of State and sovereignty in the face of the globalization of economic
relations. In other words, the central argument of this Article is that the
emergent system of global governance depends on a fundamental
reconstitution of our conventional Westphalian-inspired ideas of sovereignty
and Statehood. This Article is divided into three parts. First, it endeavors to
3. Neil MacCornick, Beyond the Sovereign State, 56 MOD. L. REV. 1, 8 (1993). See also Neil
MacCormick, Liberalism, Nationalism and the Post-Sovereign State, in CONSTITTrONALISM IN
TRANSFORMATION: EUROPEAN AND THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 141 (Richard Bellamy & Dario
Castiglione eds., 1996).
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establish the efficacy of a structuralist perspective in the analysis of the
transformation of sovereignty under the pressure of the globalization of
economic relations. Second, it subjects to critical scrutiny the "unitary State"
assumption of international relations theory by identifying the key actors in
regulatory regimes as independent State agencies who are increasingly seen
as playing an "international role" within the domestic State apparatus.
Finally, it seeks to challenge some of the presumptions of international
lawyers about the nature of international law. This challenge arises mainly
because the legal forms of regulatory regimes are governed by networks of
regulatory agencies that depend on decentralized enforcement by the national
agencies-rather than on supranational international regimes-often
reflecting a preference for compliance rather than for enforcement.
I. GLOBALIZATION, GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, AND THE
REcoNsTITUION OF SOVEREIGNTY
Periods of crisis and transformation result in critical scrutiny of the
background assumptions of many fields of study. This is markedly evident in
the discipline of international politics and law where a number of recent
studies have subjected the notion of sovereignty to sustained analysis. One
approach that may be termed "formalist," takes a rather abstract approach to
sovereignty and attempts to match abstract features of sovereignty with State
practice. Jackson,4 for example, suggests the term "quasi-states" to account
for those cases where there is a gap between juridical sovereignty and actual
State practice, such as Africa. These formalist approaches are ahistorical and
fail to grasp the fact that forms of sovereignty are not immutable but change
over time. For these theorists, sovereignty is a zero-sum game-you either
have it or you do not. Another perspective, labeled "constructionist," 5 has
been strongly shaped by post-modernist thinking and broadly suggests that
emergent forms of political conununities cannot be encompassed within
traditional notions of sovereignty. While the latter perspective is more
historically sensitive than the formalist approach in that sovereignty is viewed
as a social construction, it nevertheless remains trapped within a zero-sum
4. Seegenerally ROBERT JACKSON, QUASI STATES: SOVEREIGNTY, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSAND
TH THIRD WORLD (1990). Also see ALAN JAMES, SOVEREIGN STATEHOOD: THE BASIS FOR
INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY (1986), for another example of a formalist analysis.
5. See generally STATE SOVEREIGNTY AS SOCIAL CONSTRUCT (Thomas Biersteker & Cynthia Weber
eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1996), for a flavor of some of these constructionist arguments.
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framework because proponents of this perspective subscribe to the implicit
assumption that the global political community will move beyond sovereignty.
In contrast to these approaches, this Article adopts a "structuralist"
approach where the focus is more decidedly on the way the form of
sovereignty changes in relation to a fundamental transformation in the
structure of economic and social relations. This represents not an erosion (as
a formalist perspective might imply) or a dissolution (within a constructionist
perspective), but a fundamental transformation of the form of sovereignty. As
MacCormick points out, the real significance of the EU is the fact that it
suggests that sovereignty is being reconstituted in a way which challenges the
conventional models that underpin our understanding of the domestic legal
and political order.6
MacCormick rightly draws our attention to the importance of the EU for
the emergence of complex sovereignty, but equally important in this regard is
the emergence of new structures of global governance and regulation.
Practitioners and scholars of international relations and law, therefore, need
to forge new conceptual tools to explore the mechanisms and structures of
international regulatory regimes; these tools promise to be an important
property of the emergent complex7 global order. In part, this Article has been
prompted by the observation that international regulation is now becoming an
important feature of global governance. The extensive international effort to
regulate environmental, health, weapons, and even human rights standards
bears witness to this trend toward international regulation. But nowhere is this
demand for regulation more apparent than in the international financial sphere,
especially as a response to the recent Asian currency crisis. The
understanding of this emerging architecture of international regulation,
implicit in the global regulation of international financial markets, will be
greatly enhanced by the logic of the argument developed in this Article.
6. See generally MacCornick, Liberalism, Nationalism and the Post-Sovereign State, supra note
3.
7. I use "complexity" in the sene that Robert Jervis uses the term to indicate the nature of
interconnectedness where "the fates of the units and their relations with others are strongly influenced by
interactions at other places and at earlier periods oftime." ROBERT JERVIS, SYSTEM EFFECTS: COMPLEXITY
IN POLITICAL AND SOCIAL LIFE 17 (1997).
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The interdisciplinary work between international relations and
international law of the last decade8 is well suited for handling the topic of
global regulation because of the increasing trend towards cooperation between
domestic regulatory agencies to secure compliance with internationally agreed
standards. Domestic regulatory agencies often act independently of their
governments and in concert with private actors in a range of areas extending
from financial and securities regulation to environment and health. Although
this form of regulatory cooperation has become an important mode of
governance in the global economy, it is important to recognize that the nature
and form of this regulatory cooperation differs significantly from the standard
or classical model of international organization and law that informs much of
contemporary international relations and law.
For scholars of international relations, international regulatory regimes
reflect the emergence of new modes of global governance; for international
legal scholars they reflect the emergence of new forms of international law.
In fact, what these regulatory regimes essentially achieve is to expose the
limitations of the Westphalian assumption of mainstream international
relations and law, namely that territory is the central component of State
sovereignty, thereby conjuring up a legal world composed of interacting
unitary States. From an international law perspective,9 many regulatory
regimes fail to pass muster because international organizations are considered
to be "organizations composed of states and constituted by formal treaty."'"
Similarly, from an international relations perspective, regulatory regimes
strike at the heart of the Westphalian assumption of a political world of
unitary State actors because these regimes are composed of relatively
autonomous (often self-regulatory) State agencies and private or non-
governmental actors, thereby confusing the disciplinary boundary markers
between the international and domestic domains.
8. For an early and influential attempt to incorporate international relations to international law, see
generally Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International
Lawyers, 14 YALE J. INT'L L 335 (1989). For an excellent survey ofthe interdisciplinary literature see also,
Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda,
87 AM. J. INT'L. L 205 (1993); Anne-Marie Slaughter et al., International Law and International Relations
Theory: A New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship, 92 AM. J. INT'L. L 367 (1998).
9. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
(1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
10. David Zaring, International Law by Other Means: The Twilight Existence of International
Financial Regulatory Organizations, 33 TEX. INT'L LJ. 281, 285 (1998).
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Slaughter et al. perceptively point to the need to rethink the relationship
between international relations and law on the grounds that:
[I]t is time to move beyond the canonical narratives of how
the disciplines evolved, both separately and in conjunction
with each other. These narratives are valuable both as
intellectual history, providing necessary context for current
debates, and as bulwarks against the ad hoc, borrowing of
terms and concepts. But it is time to move on."
In this sprit of Slaughter et al., we need to work toward an alternative
framework to move beyond the increasingly irrelevant Westphalian paradigm
to understand the development of new modes of governance in the global
economy. 12 These forms of governance-be they the emergence of the EU or
the emergence of new forms of international regulation-challenge the
Westphalian framework of sovereignty that has underpinned dominant models
of international relations and law.
H. BEYOND CONVENTIONAL MODELS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
POLITICS: A STRUCTURALIST UNDERSTANDING OF SOVEREIGNTY
In this regard, an especially influential mode of theorizing the interaction
between international law and politics in the global systems is the notion of
an international regime.' According to Krasner, an "international regime"
refers to a set of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and
decisionmaking procedures around a particular set of issues in a range of
international policy areas. 4 Stone, who has used this framework 5 to explore
11. Slaughter at al., supra note 8, at 368.
12. See generally SUSAN STRANGE, THE RETREAT OF THE STATE: THE DIFFUSION OF POWER IN THE
WORLD ECONOMY (1996) (analyzing the circumstances and conditions that have contributed to the decline
of the Westphalian model).
13. See generally Abbott, supra note 8 (illustrating an early use of the notion of international regimes
in the context of international law). In international relations, the seminal analysis is by Krasner and
Ruggie. See generally INTERNATIONAL REGIMES (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983) [hereinafter Krasner].
14. See Krasner, supra note 13, at 2.
15. Stone's framework takes seriously the role of liberalism in shaping the constitutionality of
international regimes. The structure of the EU is in part determined by the liberal political rationality of
Western European States. See generally Alec Stone, What is a Supranational Constitution? An Essay in
International Relations Theory, 56 REV. POL. 441 (1994). See also Mark Beeson & Kanishka Jayasuriya,
The Political Rationalities ofRegionalism: APEC and the EU in Comparative Perspective, 11 PAC. REV.
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the "constitutionality" of international regimes, maintains that international
regimes differ to the degree to which they codify norms and institutionalize
decisionmaking procedures. 6 For example, the EU represents the evolution
of a highly developed constitutional order, whereas the institution of the
balance of power or deterrence represents the manifestation of the most
rudimentary norms within the international system.
The analysis of international regimes clearly has much to offer for a
comprehensive understanding of the institutions of the contemporary global
economy. For instance, its emphasis on the development of institutions and
norms within the international system does not necessarily require the
existence of formal international organizations. Additionally, it has the
capacity to incorporate within its framework the plurality and fragmentation
of the international response to "global" problems on a range of issues.
However, the regime framework is ill-suited for the analysis of emergent
forms of global governance. Thus, for example, in the area of regulatory
cooperation this analysis is still trapped within the basic confines of the
Westphalian paradigm of sovereignty, and as such is not able to encompass
within its framework some of the fundamental changes in the architecture of
international law.
Perhaps the best reflection of the "Westphalian bias" of the regime theory
is the fact that regimes are seen to be composed of States (often through
treaty) and involve some degree of "government" at the international level.
In many international regimes the treaty is the central component through
which States cooperate with one another; it is implicitly or explicitly based on
a contractual model of State relationships. 17 This contractual model of regime
formation is underpinned by the Westphalian model in which sovereignty is
linked with exclusive territorial jurisdiction."8 It is precisely this model of
sovereignty which is transforming under the pressure of the globalization of
economic relations. The critical point to note is that the very notion of
311, 331(1998).
16. See Stone, supra note 15, at 470.
17. Abram Chayes & Anotonia Handler Chayes, On Compliance, 47 INT'L ORG. 175, 175 n.2 (1993).
18. Ruggie rightly sees this territoriality as an important component of modernity. See generally
Ruggie, supra note 1.
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sovereignty needs to be unbundled from its link with territory;"'9 models of
sovereignty are embedded in specific social and economic structures and as
these structures change, so does the form of sovereignty.
Therefore, central to this new thinking is the view that sovereignty should
be seen and understood as a historical concept that changes over time.
Rosenberg, for example, has shown that the notion of sovereignty is a
distinctive political form that enabled not only a set of external economic
relations within formally equal States, but perhaps more importantly, allowed
the constitution of separate public and private spheres so central to the
emergence of capitalist economy.20 Arguing along these lines, Rosenberg
maintains that:
[T]he historical rise of the sovereign state is thus one aspect
of a comprehensive reorganization of the forms of social
power. The change that it works in the form and content of
the international society is no less startling. For under this
new arrangement, while relations of citizenship and
jurisdiction define state borders, any aspects of social life
which are mediated by relations of exchange in principle no
longer receive a political definition (though they are still
overseen by the state in various ways) and hence may extend
across these borders.2
In a nutshell, sovereignty can be considered a specific political form which is
distinctive of capitalism and consequentially has enabled the constitution of
a distinct sphere of international economic activity.
However, this model of sovereignty, inextricably linked with the notion
of territory, is consistent with the growth and emergence of national
economies; in contrast, the development of a global economy-rather than an
19. For an historical analysisof changing notions of sovereignty, see generally JENs BARTELSON, A
GENEALOoY OF SOVEREIGNTY (1995).
20. Ellen Meiksins Wood, for example, has argued that "the differentiation of the economic and the
political in capitalism is, more precisely, a differentiation of political functions themselves and their
separate allocation to the private economic sphere and the public sphere of the state." Ellen Meiksins
Wood, The Separation of the Economic and the Political in Capitalism, 127 NEWLEFTREV. 66,82 (1981).
It should be noted that the notion of sovereignty that we term "Westphalian" is a broad term that includes
the emergence of liberal state forms, which isthe object of Rosenberg's analysis.
21. JUSTIN ROSENBMsO, TIE EMPrE OF CrVIL SOCIETY: A CRrIQUE OF THE REALIST THEORY OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 129 (1994).
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international economy-and the associated reorganization of social power, has
transformed this essentially territorial model of sovereignty. It is important
to recognize that this argument points to the transformation of the notion of
sovereignty-not merely an erosion or a replacement by a global leviathan.
Cognizant of the fact that models of sovereignty are not fixed and immutable
but contingent upon changing frameworks of economic and political power,
we are able to move beyond the simplistic debates about erosion of the State
to consider the ramification of changing forms of sovereignty" by
reformulating basic concepts such as "national" and "international" in the
study of international law and politics.
Conceptualizing sovereignty in these dynamic terms removes it from the
formalist straightjacket in which it has been generally understood by scholars
of both international relations and international law. The reformulation
proposed here would suggest that the formal legal category of sovereignty is
constantly adjusted to respond to the changing social forms of capitalism. The
works of legal theorist Karl Renner exemplify this approach. Renner points
out that the notion of property as a legal category played a vastly different role
in simple commodity production, where producers of goods are independent
artisans who own the means of production, from the situation that prevails in
a modern complex capitalist economy.23 Renner's argument demonstrates the
need to analyze the evolution of the legal institution in terms of the distinction
between legal categories that may remain static, and the social functions of
these categories, which are more dynamic.24 Therefore, the critical analytical
task is to understand the role played by legal categories under different
economic structures. As Renner puts it, "this constant divergence between
legal norm and social efficacy provides the only explanation for the evolution
of the law."' In short, the adoption of Renner's methodology allows us to
move beyond static and formalistic understandings of sovereignty and have a
better appreciation of a contingent model of sovereignty.
Central to the new global economy is the disjunction between the
territorial nature of sovereignty and the increasing global nature of economic
22. See generally BARTELSON, supra note 19, for a somewhat similar thesis about how the contingent
nature of sovereignty fails to locate changing models of sovereignty in the shifting structural frameworks
of capitalism.
23. KARL RBNNER, THE INSTIUTIONS OF PRIVATE LAW AND THEIR SOCIAL FUNCTIONS 105-22 (0.
Kahn-Freund ed. & Agnes Schwarzschild trans., 1949).
24. See id. at 56.
25. Id. at 52.
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flows. In short, the territorial jurisdiction of the modem State over economic
life is increasingly constrained by the globalization of economic and social
relations. Susan Strange, in a sophisticated analysis of these changes in the
global political economy,26 provides a two-fold argument: one, that all
States-small and weak-have had their authority and functions greatly
diminished because of the integration of States into the global economy; and,
two, that "some of the fundamental responsibilities of the State in a market
economy-responsibilities first recognized, described, and discussed at
considerable length by Adam Smith over 200 years ago-are not now being
adequately discharged by anyone."'2 By identifying the significant increase
in the power of non-State actors in the global system, Strange makes an
important contribution to the study of States and the global political economy.
In particular, she draws attention to the role and power of financial markets in
constraining the ability of the State to effectively intervene in large areas of
economic life. She also observes that: "the authority over society state and
economy is undergoing another period of diffusion after two or three centuries
in which authority became increasingly centralized in the institutions of the
state.
28
Interestingly, Cohen advances a related thesis in an account of recent
changes in the international monetary order in which he distinguishes between
"spaces of places" and "spaces of flows." 9 He suggests that our conventional
imagery of currency is inherently territorial and is becoming increasingly
redundant. A classic instance of this is the growth of "dollarization" in many
Latin American economies where private agents use U.S. dollars instead of
their own local currency; yet another dramatic example can be found in the
movement toward European monetary integration. This emergent monetary
order, Cohen contends, subverts our territorial understanding of monetary
space with an imagery that is more in tune with the transnational networks of
capital.3" In other words, the greater integration of capital and money markets
requires that we move from a notion of "spaces of place" to "spaces of
networks." As Cohen puts it, network images run counter to territorial
conceptions of place mainly because the "authoritative domain" of the
26. See generally STRANGE, supra note 12.
27. Id. at 14.
28. Id. at 86.
29. See BENJAMIN COHEN, THE GEOGRAPHY OF MONEY 8-26 (1998).
30. See id. at 8.
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currency-its sphere of influence, if you like-may not be congruent with
territorial boundaries.3 1 Echoing Strange, this leads Cohen to the view that:
Governments today are less and less capable of preserving
even a modicum of monetary autarky; in a world of extensive
cross-border competition among currencies, authority is not
exercised solely by the state. On the contrary, private actors
too play a key role, through their choices among vehicles to
use for various monetary purposes.3'
Both Cohen and Strange provide a valuable analysis of the growing
disjunction between the functional domain of economic activity and territorial
reach of the sovereign; but, from this persuasive premise, they reach the
flawed conclusion that sovereignty is subject to a process of gradual erosion,
or to use Strange's evocative phrase, the "diffusion of authority from state to
market."33 As previously argued, a conclusion of this nature can be reached
only by construing the legal category of sovereignty in static and formalistic
terms. As against this, my argument is that the notion of sovereignty is being
transformed, not eroded, by the process of globalization.
In this connection, Picciotto too points out that the notions of jurisdiction
or the domain over which State power can be exercised has always been
flexible. For example, he points out that historically, the identification of
sovereignty with the nation '"ransforms the basis of the exercise of the State
sovereignty into the more flexible and elusive notion of national
jurisdiction." According to him, there is a flexibility in notions of
jurisdiction with regard to commercial activities, and this often provides a
wider jurisdictional reach of the State than that assumed by the territorial
model of sovereignty. Hence:
Jurisdiction over a corporation can be based on the fictions
either of its nationality or residence, and can vary for
different purposes, using as criteria either the law under
which it is formed, the location of its "seat" or head office, or
31. See id. at 13.
32. Id. at 25.
33. See STRANGE, supra note 12, at 197.
34. Pieciotto, supra note 2, at 99.
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the place from which central management or control are
exercised. A "control" test may be used to justify a claim to
jurisdiction over the worldwide activities of transnational
corporate groups or Transnational Corporations (TNCs), on
the grounds that foreign subsidiaries are subject to ultimate
control by their dominant shareholders or parent company,
and states have increasingly asserted such jurisdiction over
"foreign" companies especially to defeat or prevent
regulatory avoidance by the use of "foreign" subsidiaries
incorporated in jurisdictions of convenience.35
A good exemplar of the elasticity of the notion of sovereignty in the face
of its disjunction by globalization is provided by the U.S. Supreme Court
decision in the case of Hartford Insurance Co. v. California.' This case
involved a conspiracy by London-based coinsurance companies to limit the
kind of insurance provided in the United States, particularly in relation to the
limitation on pollution claims. As Andreas Lowenfeld points out, the
significant jurisdictional issue here was the fact that defendants had conspired
in another jurisdiction to "offer reinsurance to American companies except on
terms to which the London defendants had jointly agreed, thus harming parties
for whom the state attorneys general acted as parentes patriae."I The English
defendants, while not disputing the effects on the United States, contended
that their conduct was fully legal in England and, by the normal standards of
international comity, U.S. jurisdiction should not apply in this case. In other
words, this is a line of defense fully compatible with the traditional model of
sovereignty described above. However, the important point in this case was
the fact that the Court established the relative importance of the effect (in this
case, the United States) over conduct (in this case, England) and clearly placed
much more importance on the former rather than on the latter and established
and reinforced precedents for the extraterritorial reach of the U.S. judicial
system.
The technical issues raised by the case need not detain us. Its importance
lies in the fact that the territorial model of sovereignty is giving way to more
35. Id. at 99-100.
36. See generally Hartford Fire ns. Co. v. California, 113 S. Ct. 2891 (1993).
37. Andreas Lowenfeld, Conflict, Balancing of Interests, and the Exercise of Jurisdiction to
Prescribe: Reflections on the Insurance Antitrust Case, 89 AM. J. INT'L L 42, 43-44 (1995).
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flexible notions of jurisdiction based on effects rather than place of conduct.
The debate over the consistency of the decision with the notions of
jurisdiction in international law is relevant in that it points to the elasticity of
the notion of sovereignty in the face of the changing structure of global
economic relations.' However, important as these attempts are to establish
a basis for an extra-territorial notion of sovereignty, a potentially greater far-
reaching development has been the disruption of the internal "unity" or
sovereignty of the modem territorial State.
III. FRAGMENTATION AND THE INTERNAL SOVEREIGNTY OF THE STATE
Emerging forms of "complex sovereignty" break down the internal
structural coherence of the State, replacing it with often autonomous
regulatory agencies whose purpose is to meditate between the international
and the local or national. The emergence of the polycentric centers of power
within the State,3 therefore, internationalizes certain agencies (e.g., central
banks) within the State while at the same time serving to break down the
boundaries between domestic and international polities and law. Again, these
emergent properties of sovereignty pose important, even revolutionary,
implications for the study of international law and politics. But-contrary to
those who seek to describe this as a new "medievalism"-the argument
advanced here reinforces the thesis that this is a transformation, not an
erosion, of sovereignty.
One of the cardinal features of the modem State-is the development of
"internal sovereignty" or internal coherence within the State.' A central
feature of the early State was the conflict between autonomous centers-be
they corporate or ecclesiastical-as they sought to defend their prerogatives
and immunities. However, one of the major achievements of the nineteenth-
38. See, e.g., Phillip Trimble, The Supreme Court and InternationalLaw: The Demise ofRestatement
Section 403, 89 AM. J. INT'L L 53, 57 (1995). Trimble's formalist analysis fails to uncover the fact that
legal categories constantly adjust to changes in the underlying distribution of social power.
39. For a discussion of the notion of the fragmented or regulatory State, see generally Jayasuriya,
supra note 2. See also Kanishka Jayasuriya, Globalization, Authoritarian Liberalism and the
Developmental State, Keynote Paper, International Workshop on Globalization and Social Welfare in East
Asia. Research Centre on Development and International Relations, Aalborg University (Denmark 1998)
(on file with author). It is important to note that these agencies have relationships with specialized domestic
and international constituencies.
40. 1 follow Poggi in using the term "internal sovereignty" to describe the development of this internal
coherence within the State. GIANFRANcO POGI, TIM DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODERN STATE: A
SOCIOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION 92 (1978).
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century State was the emergence of the State as the exclusive center of all
authoritative decisionmaking; the State institutionalized the principle of
internal sovereignty and thereby established a unitary "monistic" legal order.
As Poggi observes, "[mjature modem states are intrinsically 'monistic' and
represent in this a return to the Roman tradition, whereby the princeps's
power was derived from the will of the populous. The Continental juristic
construction of the state as person is a characteristically sophisticated way of
expressing this principle."4'
Indeed, from this perspective, legal positivism, particularly as exemplified
by the work of Kelsen,42 provides ajurisprudential foundation for this internal
sovereignty. Of course, this juridical unification of the State went hand in
hand with the development of a notion of a civil society. This is an important
point: the development of internal sovereignty allows the State to clearly
distinguish itself from both civil society and the market. Hence, the autonomy
of both civil society and the market order is conditioned on the emergence of
certain forms of sovereignty. To give one example, the notion of a universal
citizenship is only comprehensible in a context where there is-to use Poggi's
terminology-a monistic legal order. But perhaps more importantly, in terms
of the thesis in this Article, the coherence of the State is ofthe first importance
in establishing a juristic foundation for a domestic market order. From this
structuralist perspective, this particular form of internal sovereignty within the
State is determined by a particular configuration of economic and social
relationships.
However-and this is the nub of the thesis developed here-with the
globalization of economic relations, there is a growing incongruity between
a territorial notion of sovereignty and the flow of economic activity which
disrupts the internal unity or coherence of the State. Increasingly, various
agencies and institutions within the State develop a high degree of autonomy
and independence;43 this fragmentation of the domestic order of the State is
central to the development of international forms of regulatory governance.
In short, the global governance of the economy requires the
internationalization of State agencies and institutions; but this can only occur
41. Id. at93.
42. See for example, HANS KELSEN, THE PURE THEORY OF LAW (Max Knight trans., 2d ed. 1967),
for an outline of these views.
43. Another way of looking at this is to see the State as an entity that is increasingly functionally
differentiated. Much of the dominant literature in international relations and law perceives the State as an
undifferentiated entity.
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if these institutions possess a degree of autonomy from other institutions
within the State. In other words, the fragmentation of the State is the form that
sovereignty takes in an increasingly global economy.
It is important to remember, of course, that even within the parameters of
the nineteenth century State, internal sovereignty was never completely
dominant. According to Poggi, "[t]he army, the police, the diplomatic service,
and sometimes top judicial bodies maintain substantially autonomous lines
and traditions of political action, with the result that each operates in some
cases as a 'state within the state' as a de facto holder of autonomous political
prerogatives."
Nevertheless, the fact remains that globalization has accelerated the
development of autonomous agencies, the development of "a state within a
state." Slaughter underlines these observations by noting that more and more
transgovernmental networks of regulatory agencies, such as central banks,
rather than supranational institutions, will be increasingly preferred as a form
of governance of the global political economy. She argues that:
"[d]isaggregating the state permits the disaggregation of sovereignty as well,
ensuring that specific state institutions derive strength and status from
participation in transgovernmental order." 45 In a nutshell, the globalization of
economic relations increasingly fractures the internal cohesiveness within the
State, but this fracturing means the creation of islands of sovereignty within
the State.
A good example of this fragmentation or disaggregation of the State is the
development of independent central banks. Central bank independence'
provides a means of purchasing-albeit not always successfully-domestic
stability through the credible commitment to pursue "market friendly"
monetary policy; but this is at the cost of the fragmentation of the State and
the increasing procedural nature of monetary policy. A major reason for the
enhanced power of central banks is the growing importance of monetary
policy in an era dominated by the demand for more global financial
integration. It is important to recognize that these changes reflect not just a
44. POOGI, supra note 40, at 94.
45. Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, 76 FOREIGN AFF. 183, 196 (Sept.-Oct. 1997).
46. For a discussion of central bank independence, which places it in the context of changes in the
global political economy see generally Kanishka Jayasuriya, Political Economy of the Central Banks, 29
AusTL. J. POL. SCL 115 (Mar. 1994); see also Sylvia Maxfield, Financial Incentives and Central Bank
Authority in Industrializing Nations, 46 WORLD POL. 556 (1994); SYLVIA MAXFIELD, GATEKEEPERS OF
GROWTH: THE INTERNATIONAL POLmcICAL ECONOMY OF CENTRAL BANKINO IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
(1997).
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shift of policy instruments from fiscal to monetary policy, but also a shift of
power within the State toward agencies such as central banks. This was not
just a technical change to a new set of policy instruments, but a significant
change in the mode of coordination within the State. In turn, this trend toward
more independent central banks' reflects profound structural changes in the
international political economy, particularly the increasing importance of
global transnational financial structures. Therefore, the emergence of
independent central banks and the reconfiguration of the State that this implies
are a manifestation of the deeper structural changes taking place in the global
political economy, especially in the nature of international markets.
Clearly, independent central banks have become a major focus in the
internal restructuring of the State because of the inherent complexities of a
global political economy, such as those resulting from highly mobile capital
requiring a high level of creditability and the commitment to the pursuit of
"hard money" policies. The economic argument for monetary credibility is
that monetary signals are important for domestic and international economic
actors. However, to be effective, this signaling process needs to be credible.
In turn, this credibility is gained by a perceived commitment on the part of
monetary authorities to achieve specific monetary objectives which are best
achieved through enhanced institutional independence from monetary
authorities.'
It needs to be recognized that independent central banks are actively
engaged in the regulation of international financial markets (e.g., through the
Basle Capital Accord to be discussed below or through their critical role in
implementing structural adjustment programs of the IMF), but they participate
in these regulatory systems as independent, autonomous actors. In turn, these
agencies are often required to implement international regulations or
agreements at the national level. Slaughter aptly terms this the
"nationalization of international law." '49 However, the important point to
observe is the way in which structural changes in the global political economy
lead to changes in the form of State sovereignty; these changes serve to
radically reconstitute our understanding of the traditional boundaries between
the international and the domestic spheres because agencies such as
47. For a comprehensive overview of the arguments for central bank independence, see generally,
Jayasuriya, supra note 46.
48. See ALEX CUKERMAN, CENTRAL BANK STRATEGY, CREDIBIITY, AND INDEPENDENCE: THEORY
AND EVIDENCE 255-57 (1992).
49. Slaughter, supra note 45, at 192.
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independent central banks are simultaneously part of the domestic order and
a range of global governance mechanisms.
IV. FRAGMENTATION OF SOVEREIGNTY AND THE
POLYCENTRIC LEGAL ORDER
One of the ramifications of State fragmentation and the greater
permeability of the boundary between domestic and international domains is
the emergence of a polycentric legal order that directly contradicts the
"monistic" legal order implied by an internally unified State. Perhaps the best
exemplar of this polycentric legal order and its disruption of the internal
sovereignty of the State is the EU. It is useful to examine the experience of
the EU not only to illustrate the emergence of new forms of sovereignty but
also because the EU serves as a fulcrum for institutional innovation in the area
of governance regimes that might point to developments in other areas of the
global political system.
However, the application of a Westphalian notion of sovereignty to the
EU requires the adoption of two problematic approaches to the question of
sovereignty in the emergent European legal order-one pertains to a
supranationalism, and the other to a statist model of the EU as a product of
intergovemmentalism. The supranationalism approach sees in the EU the
strengthening roots of a new federal constitutional order-an order that will
result in a layer of supranational governance. It envisages the EU as a form
of "co-operative federalism" which relies on formal and informal mechanisms
of cooperation between Member States and the new center. As Bellamy and
Castiglione point out, proponents of this approach do not necessarily advocate
the centralization of political decisionmaking but suggest that sovereignty
should move beyond the confines of the nation-state.' This perspective places
a great emphasis on the constitutionalization of governmental functions,5 and
as such has much in common with the broad liberal approaches to
international regimes. 2 From this viewpoint, the function of international law
is to uncover the increasing constitutionalization of multilateral regimes. To
be sure, the EU represents a form of constitutionalism unmatched by other
50. See Richard Bellamy & Dario Castiglione, Building the Union: The Nature of Sovereignty in the
PoliticalArchitecture of Europe, 16 L & PHIL. 421, 427 (1997).
51. Joseph Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE LJ. 2403,2413-31 (1991).
52. See Stone, supra note 15, at 463, for an outline of such an argument.
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multilateral regimes; but as Stone argues, this is essentially a difference in the
relative constitutionalization of international regimes."
In contrast, the intergovernmentalism approach statist model insists that
the national State in Europe remains strong. This is argued on the grounds
that State interests remain the driving force of the EU, as well as the fact that
the State still has a high degree of internal sovereignty. Thus, the EU is seen
as an association of States that pool sovereignty in order to pursue common
interests. This pooling of sovereignty is largely driven by the Council of
Ministers influenced by geopolitical considerations and interests. As Mann
points out:
The major encroachments on national sovereignty are not
really constitutional-the replacement of one sovereignty by
another. Instead, they are the practical, surreptitious, and
delayed implementations of decisions taken by the Council of
Ministers, whose decision-making processes reflect partly
consensus and partly the geopolitical influence of the various
member Powers.'
Milward, in his account of the evolution of the EU suggests that the European
integration, far from leading to the demise of the nation-state, is a way of
ensuring its survival." In short, from this perspective, the emergence of the
EU does little to disrupt the monistic legal order of the sovereign State.
This second approach is deeply flawed. The EU as an entity is surely
more than a pooling of sovereignty. The increasing incorporation of the
European Court of Justice (ECJ) judgments into national law and the many
references by national courts to the ECJ is in itself a telling factor against
those like Milward and Mann who argue for primacy of the national State in
the EU. But at a deeper level, the problem with this argument is that it sees
the European integration process as a move away from sovereignty rather than
a reconstitution of sovereignty. The "federalist" perspective, while
empirically richer as an account of the integration, suffers from a similarly
fixed understanding of sovereignty; but here, the image of monistic legal order
53. See id. at 473.
54. Michael Mann, Nation-States in Europe and Other Countries: Diversifying, Developing, Not
Dying, 122 DAEDALUS 115, 127 (1993).
55. ALAN MILwARD, THE EUROPEAN RESCUE OF THE NATION STATE 44 (1992).
56. See Neil MacCormick, Beyond the Sovereign State, 56 MOD. L REv. 1, 8 (1993).
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is simply transferred to the level of the EU. Both perspectives, while reaching
antagonistic conclusions, proceed from similar premises about the nature of
sovereignty; sovereignty is a zero-sum game in which the emphasis is on the
distribution of a fixed quantum of sovereign power rather than on how and
where it is produced.
A distinguishing feature of the EU is the emergence of a polity that cannot
be understood within traditional confines of territorial-based sovereignty. The
difference between a traditional model of sovereignty and the emergent
complex sovereignty of the European political order can be seen clearly in the
differing emphases placed by the former on government and by the latter on
governance; the emerging European polity is composed of multiple layers of
governance requiring the participation of State agencies, non-State actors, and
European institutions to create a form of "interlocking politics." Interlocking
politics in the EU system refers to the highly ambiguous and overlapping
division of labor between the national and EU levels that characterize
policymaking in the European polity. In fact, much of this governance takes
place through the operation of networks of public and private actors located
at differing levels of government. Several studies of the EU demonstrate that
governance through policy networks is increasingly the preferred form of
regulation. Indeed, as Risse-Kappen notes, governance through policy
networks is particularly evident in policy domains subject to the heavy
influence of EU policies. He goes on to state that "the more a particular
policy sector has been integrated and the more decisions in the area are
governed by majority rule, the more likely it is that the policy-making process
is characterized by transnational and transgovernmental coalitions among
private, subnational, and supranational actors rather that intergovernmental
bargaining."'57 Of particular importance is the so-called "comitology web"
which brings together various groups of national experts and officials in
various sectors, such as for example, foodstuffs, drugs, health, and safety
which are central to the regulation of the single market.'
It is beyond the scope of this Article to examine these developments in
detail, but the critical point that needs to be underscored is that these
developments point strongly to the emergence of a polycentric legal order that
57. Thomas Risse-Kappen, Exploring the Nature of the Beast: International Relations Theory and
Comparative Policy Analysis Meet the European Union, 34 J. COMMON MARKET STUD. 53, 66 (1996).
58. For a survey of these committees, see generally Christian Joerges & Jtrgen Neyer, From
IntergovernmentalBargaining to Deliberative Political Process: The Constitutionalisation ofComitology,
3 EUR. LJ. 273 (1997).
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is at odds with the monistic order implied by the assumption of internal
sovereignty of the Westphalian model. MacCormick aptly describes the
nature of this sovereignty when he observes that:
In the traditional legal sense of "sovereignty," member states
of the European Union no longer constitute legally sovereign
entities. Nor does the Union, nor its internal pillar the
Community, constitute a sovereign entity. The distribution
of sovereign rights at various levels of course leaves a
compendious "external sovereignty" of all the member states
intact and even in a sense strengthened.59
Sovereignty is reconfigured in the sense that it is no longer exercised within
a monistic legal and decisionmaking structure;' instead, it is parceled and
diffused across a range of governmental and nongovernmental authorities.
Here, the constitutional principle of subsidiarity" is the appropriate
constitutional description of this new and reconstituted sovereignty.
Undoubtedly, the EU furnishes the best example of the emergence of a
polycentric legal order; but illustrations of other reconfigurations of
sovereignty can also be found in other contexts. For instance, the World
Bank's governance programs may be cited as good examples of these
processes. Governance programs seek to build and make transparent a whole
range of regulatory institutions; but, in so doing, it is necessary first to make
these institutions more independent from central State apparatus, thereby
constituting islands of sovereignty within the State. As a process (though it
does have a different normative basis), this has some affinity with the
multilevel governance of the European polity.6
In recent years, multilateral agencies have placed a great deal of emphasis
on building effective systems of governance in the developing world,
59. Neil MacCormickDemocracy, Subsidiarity and Citizenship in the "European Commonwealth,"
16 L. & PHIL. 31 (1997).
60. For an exploration of these issues, see Christian Joerges, Taking the Law Seriously: On Political
Science and the Role ofLaw in the Process of European Integration, 2 EUR. L.J. 105, 106-35 (1996).
61. For a discussion of the concept of subsidiarity, see MacCormick, supra note 56. Hugh Emy
funther explains subsidiarity as "delegating responsibility for action or policy to the level deemed most
appropriate in society." HUGH V. EMY, REMAKINO AUSTRALIA: THE STATE, THE MARKET AND
AUSTRALIA'S FUTURE 212 (1993).
62. For a consideration of some of these normative differences in the construction of regional
groupings, see Beeson & Jayasuriya, supra note 15, at 314-15.
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especially in the transitional economies. Not only is most lending tied to the
effective implementation of governance programs, but multilateral agencies
have followed up on these concerns with extensive aid programs for
institutional strengthening or capacity building. The tenor of recent economic
reforms in transitional economies and in Southeast Asian countries has been
on establishing credible and independent regulatory institutions. A key
element in the evolution of a framework of regulatory governance is the
establishment of independent regulatory frameworks with a capacity to
commit itself to credible policies."3
Governance programs emerged out of the experience of structural
adjustment programs of the 1980s. International policymakers, puzzled by the
apparent failure of structural adjustment programs, began to examine more
closely the capacity of economic and bureaucratic institutions to implement
economic reform packages. As a World Bank discussion paper on governance
noted:
For some of the bank's borrowers the effectiveness of both
adjustment and investment operations is impeded by factors
which contribute to poor development management. These
include weak institutions, lack of an adequate legal
framework, weak financial accounting and auditing systems,
damaging discretionary interventions, uncertain and variable
policy frameworks and a closed decision-making which
increases risks of corruption and waste."
In fact, governance programs provide a complementary set of institution
building programs to support economic adjustment programs.
The emphasis placed on the role of the State as a regulator-which
multilateral agencies seem to have recognized-requires not a reduction in the
role of the State, but rather a restructuring of its governmental functions,
shifting the "boundary between the public and private sectors, thereby
enlarging the latter, with the government's role changing from direct provision
63. AsIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, GOVERNANCE: SOUND DEVELOPMENT MANAGEMENT (1995).
64. WORLD BANK, MANAoING DEVELOPMENT: THE GOVERNANCE DIMENSION 2 (1991).
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to regulation."65 One of the concerns of the governance program has been to
ensure that the process of economic deregulation and privatization does not
lead to the capturing of key markets by politically connected groups and
individuals, and these concerns have taken on added importance in the light
of the economic crisis in Asia.
For this reason, one of the major concerns of governance is the
development of the "rule of law," and to this end there has been a concerted
effort to promote legal reform programs in a number of developing States. For
example, there are a number of projects in China that seek to establish credible
and functional legal institutions. The widespread adoption of foreign
commercial law in China is influenced by a highly instrumentalist approach
to law and institution building; law is seen as bits of technology, dislocated
from its broader normative assumptions, to be employed where useful. This
is strikingly apparent in the rapid growth of foreign trade arbitration in China
as well as in a number of other emerging economies. But the important point
is that the globalization of the Chinese economy leads to the constitution of
distinct arenas of law for different groups and interests, a fragmentation of the
legal order that stands in sharp contrast to the monistic legal order implied by
the conventional notions of sovereignty. Rule of law and governance
programs are clear manifestations of a polycentric legal order.
These examples are sufficient to illustrate the thesis that globalization
leads to the rupturing of the internal sovereignty of the State-a sovereignty
so central to the conventional Westphalian understandings of sovereignty.
However, this results not in the dissolution of sovereignty but its
reconstitution in a different, more polycentric, form. It is this fragmentation
that leads to the emergence of a polycentric legal order more attuned to the
governance rather than the "government" of the global economic and political
system. It is best reflected in the increasing emphasis on international
regulation through networks of regulatory agencies.
V. INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY STATE AND NETWORK GOVERNANCE
One of the important features of governance mechanisms in the global
economy is the emergence of a system of regulatory networks. As the State
becomes fragmented, regulatory agencies increasingly develop international
connections with other regulatory agencies, thereby taking on an
65. WORLD BANK, GovERN ~cE: THE WORLD BANK WASHINGTON D.C. (1994).
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"international" function. This reconstitution of sovereignty in a world of rapid
globalization takes the "internal" form of fragmentation and polycentricity and
the "external" form of "network governance." In fact, regulatory systems have
become increasingly important in the management of the global economy and
pose important challenges to our conception of the way international law is
formulated and enforced; these regulatory webs do not depend on formal
international treaties or rely on international organizations for their
enforcement. In short, the emergence of an international regulatory State
depends on and requires the active participation of agencies within the State.
Again, the importance of the reconstitution of sovereignty in these new
systems of global regulation should be recognized. We can term this a form
of "network governance."" As Picciotto observes:
[T]hese contacts can aptly be described as taking place
through networks, in a number of senses. Firstly, they are
informal or semi-formal in nature: even when they are
publicly visible, they are often not founded on conventional
legal instruments such as treaties, but on "gentlemen's
agreements" which may be semi-secret.67
Often these regulatory networks' rely on the application of informal
standards rather than a set of formal rules; but more importantly, the operation
of these regulatory systems depend on the national application of
internationally formulated standards. In this regard, it bears out Slaughter's
contention that the reconstitution of sovereignty represents the nationalization
of international law.69 What this signifies is that the operation of the global
economy requires extensive regulatory changes at the national level.
66. See Picciotto, supra note 2, at 111.
67. Id. at 112.
68. Picciotto's analysis of the legal governance of regulatory cooperation is a pioneering attempt to
grapple with some of the major theoretical and empirical issues raised by regulatory cooperation. See
Picciotto, supra note 2. In addition, David Zaring's recent work on international financial organization also
is an excellent overview of the implications for international law of regulatory cooperation. See generally
Zaring, supra note 10, at 281-301. Of course, there is extensive international political economy literature
on these issues. See for example, Geoffrey Underhill, Keeping Governments Out ofPolitics: Transnational
Securities Markets, Regulatory Cooperation, and Political Legitimacy, 21 REV. INT'L STUD. 251, 251-78
(1995), who underlines the importance of network governance.
69. See Slaughter, supra note 45, at 192.
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Therefore, if network governance is the preferred form of management,
regulatory harmonization is the conceptual framework for international
regulatory networks. Again, the EU provides a good illustration; the
construction of the European Single Market has made it imperative that there
be a complementary process of regulatory harmonization or a system of
mutual recognition.7' An analogous argument can be made at the global level
that the constitution of the global economy requires similar mechanisms of
regulatory harmonization at the national level. But this depends on the
creation of "islands of sovereignty"--strong regulatory capabilities-within
the State. For a global economy to operate, there has to be a high degree of
cooperation in areas that fall within the traditional domain of the nation-state
in order to facilitate a system of global governance. Hence, this global
governance requires the nationalization of international law, which can only
be achieved through the reconstitution of sovereignty. In other words, how
sovereignty is exercised is determined by the changing structure of the
capitalist economy.
In this context, the Basle Accord on capital adequacy standards-a set of
standards agreed to by central banks to maintain adequate capital
levels-provides a useful example of this type of regulatory mechanism.
Capital adequacy has become important because of the increasing integration
of the financial services industry. As a result, there has been a demand for
greater regulation or management of this increasingly mobile banking sector.
As Peter Cook, the second chairman of the Basle Committee, points out:
There was, in effect, a supervisory vacuum in this new global
market which needed to be filled. Neither the supervisors,
nor indeed the banks themselves, had fully appreciated the
degree to which the banking environment was changing in
character and the new and increasing risks involved in
international business. Supervisors were still very much
domestically oriented within the framework of different
national banking systems. 7'
There are two significant features which stand out. First, regulatory
cooperation was driven by the desire to protect sovereignty. Second, this
70. See generally Beeson & Jayasuriya, supra note 15.
71. WOLFoAN H. REINICKE, GLOBAL PuBLIc PoLicY 104 (1998).
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cooperation could only be achieved by internationalizing regulatory agencies,
thereby rupturing the internal sovereignty of the State.
The Basle Committee's chief objective then was to strengthen the
supervision of the banking system by establishing a close relationship and
mutual cooperation between national supervisory bodies. In short, any
regulation had to be within its objective working through consensual
supervisory standards and practices; this meant that it had to operate through
a dense regulatory web of national agencies. This in turn poses a significant
challenge for international lawyers mainly because the Basle Committee does
not attempt to enforce detailed harmonization but depends on national
supervisory agencies pursuing broadly accepted guidelines.' In this respect,
the mode of regulation exemplified by the Basle Accord crucially depends on
the operation of the notion of subsidiarity. According to Reinicke, the Basle
Accord has two conceptions of subsidiarity. The first is a kind of functional
subsidiarity that enables the Committee to distinguish between two definitions
of capital: a core concept "which had to constitute at least fifty percent of
bank's total capital, was the same in all countries;" 3 and a lesser concept that
allowed for national variations in the definition of capital. The second
conception of subsidiarity is that of a structural subsidiarity which ensures the
implementation of the general consensual standards by national supervisory
or regulatory agencies. Indeed, the key point about the Basle Accord and the
reason it presents such an important challenge to international legal scholars
is that its implementation required the national implementation of an
internationally agreed set of standards. In this sense, structural subsidiarity
can function within a framework of economic governance at multiple levels,
and this is increasingly the norm in many international regulatory systems.
The Basle Accord is not the only regulatory framework to be sustained
through the mechanism of network governance. Another interesting example
from the international financial area, is the International Organisation of
Securities Commissions (IOSCO). The IOSCO is the body that deals with the
transnationalization of securities markets and attempts to provide a regulatory
framework for these markets. This body is comprised of State and non-State
agencies engaged in the operation of the securities market; it serves as a
regulatory response to the mobility of capital or to the increasing disjuncture
between the physical and economic geography. Again, the point to note is that
72. Zaring, supra note 10, at 289.
73. REnCKE, supra note 71, at 115-16.
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the constitution of a global financial market necessitates a high degree of
cooperation between regulatory agencies in areas normally considered to be
within the prerogative of the nation-state. In this regard, one of the main
objectives of IOSCO is the harmonization of regulatory standards, which is
facilitated by a system operating through another system of network
governance. Underhill remarks that:
[The IOSCO policy community consists in the main of
autonomous government agencies, self regulatory
organizations (SROs) and market actors, interacting as non-
governmental institutions in the international domain. In this
case, the guardians of the rules of the market, and indeed
those who make the very rules and create market structure,
are somewhat removed from traditional legislative
accountability.74
In short, network governance (the external dimension of complex sovereignty)
depends on the functioning of independent (effective) internal self-regulatory
agencies (the internal dimension of complex sovereignty).
But it is important to acknowledge that the principle of subsidiarity-so
important to the emergence of governance mechanism in a number of different
areas--could operate only because regulatory agencies had a high degree of
autonomy and independence from core political institutions. Moreover, this
autonomy and independence enabled the constitution of a system of network
governance where these agencies actively participated in the formulation and
management of the regulatory institutions.
Network governance is not unique to international relations and is a
concept that has generated a large amount of literature in the field of public
policy.75 It is worth enumerating the following characteristics of networks.
First, networks are interdependent organizations that depend on the mutual
exchange of resources to achieve their goals. Second, networks depend on
reaching procedures and decisions through broad-based consensus. And
finally, networks place a great deal of emphasis on reciprocity, for example,
74. Underhill, supra note 68, at 273.
75. R.A.W. Rhodes, Different Roads to Unfamiliar Places: UK Experience in Comparative
Perspective, 57 AUSTL J. PUB. ADMIN. 19, 27 (1998).
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the development of a normative standard of obligation. 6 This only scratches
the surface of the system of network governance, but nevertheless it is
sufficient to establish its distinctiveness as a form of international governance.
It is a system of governance that does not fit into the conventional
understandings of sovereignty or international law. Zaring, in fact, points out
that many of the international regulatory networks fail to meet the formal
requirements of international organizations as set out in the Restatement
(Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States' because these
networks are composed of State agencies with their own specific interests.'
He goes on sensibly to suggest that developments in international law "should
make a place for these important organizations in its analytical framework." 9
But of course, this would require the adoption of a different model of
sovereignty.
Another distinctive character of international regulatory governance is its
reliance on standards rather than specific rules, and this too fails to fit in with
the conventional notions of international law. Clearly, both examples-the
Basle Capital Accord and IOSCO-mentioned above rely heavily on standard
setting. Similar examples abound in the domain of environmental regulation
where standard setting, rather than rule formulation is the name of the game.
Franz Neumann suggested that the more complex and cartel forms of
capitalism herald a shift from formal abstract norms-characteristic of
competitive capitalism-to deformalized and particularized standards." Much
the same argument can be made about the shift toward standards rather than
rules in the global economy.
The importance of standards also points to the fact that international
regulatory governance is often characterized by a system of decentralized
enforcement by State agencies and authorities. The Basle Committee, after it
finalized the Accord on capital adequacy standards, left its enforcement
largely to member countries. Remarkably, some of the Basle Committee
standards have been adopted by a number of other countries which were
originally not a part of the accord. But what needs to be understood here is
that the enforcement of specific standards is left to individual regulatory
76. Id.
77. See generally RESTATEMENT, supra note 9.
78. See Zaring, supra note 10, at 306.
79. Id. at 327.
80. See FRANZ NEUMANN, THE RULE OF LAW: POLmCAL THEoRY AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM IN
MODERN SOCIETY 268 (1986).
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agencies and is not the task of a supranational authority. The Basle
Committee sees its task as broadly laying down supervisory standards and
practices. The IOSCO functions in much the same way-it leaves the task of
enforcement to the member countries and sees its role as one of broadly
monitoring compliance. It is clear this system of decentralized enforcement
is the emerging regulatory model in a range of environmental areas. For
example, the Kyoto Protocol on climate change relies on member countries to
conform to, and enforce, environmental standards. The task of the
international regulatory agency in these areas then becomes one of monitoring
the member compliance8' through audits and other mechanisms rather than
through direct enforcement of standards.
In this regard, this emergent international regulatory State has much in
common with Teubner's concept of "reflexive regulation."'82 Teubner's
central contribution was to identify two distinct regulatory systems: one,
through the use of law to directly regulate behavior, and, two, through
regulation of decentralized mechanisms whereby State regulatory attempts to
shape the general institutional conditions under vhich individual enterprises
or institutions attempt self-regulation. In short, Teubner would suggest that
increasingly, regulatory law functions at a secondary level to regulate self-
regulation. For Teubner, the increasing complexity of the social order
demands that reflexive capacity be built in to the very structure of social
subsystems.
Teubner's concept of the "regulation of self-regulation" has much to offer
our analysis of international regulatory structures. The way decentralized
enforcement operates in a range of financial areas that we have examined is
analogous to recent developments in domestic regulatory regimes where there
had been an emphasis on laying down the ground rules for self-regulation, not
regulation per se. Unlike the self-regulation of enterprises in the domestic
legal system, the self-regulation in the global arena means that it operates at
the level of relevant State agencies and actors. One of the major consequences
of this kind of global regulation is the increasing importance of procedure in
international governance. Again, the emergence of these forms of procedural
81. See Chayes & Handler Chayes, supra note 17, for an excellent discussion of the notion of
compliance. This is an area on which international law needs to focus.
82. See Gunther Teubner, Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law, 17 L. & Soc'Y 239,
239-81 (1983).
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regulatory systems cannot be adequately accommodated under conventional
understandings of international law.
It is apparent that the increasing complexity of globalization brings with
it a global system of governance and regulation. These regulatory forms have
three main features. First, they are governed by networks of State agencies
acting not on behalf of the State but as independent actors. Second, the
emergent international regulatory order is primarily concerned with laying
down standards and general regulatory principles rather than strict rules.
Finally, recent developments in international regulation in the area of finance,
securities, and the environment suggest the emergence of a system of
decentralized enforcement or the regulation of self-regulation. In other words,
the emergent regulatory system is characterized by a system of network
governance providing broad standards and depending on compliance of State
agencies in preference to direct enforcement. But a system of indirect
regulation depends on a dramatic transformation of the Westphalian notions
of sovereignty, which sit uneasily with the conventional understanding of
international law.
CONCLUSION
From the foregoing, it is clear that the process of globalization has
transformed the traditional understandings of sovereignty and its
embranglement with specific and exclusive jurisdiction over a given territorial
area. The main contention of this Article is that globalization transforms, not
dissolves or erodes, the way in which sovereignty is produced. As such, this
argument can be distinguished from a formalist analysis as well as from
cosmopolitan accounts of sovereignty. The former seeks to understand the
increasing gap between formal sovereignty and its practical effect through the
proliferation of conceptual terms such as "quasi-sovereignty," whereas the
latter moves beyond sovereignty through the construction of different kinds
of political communities. Both perspectives are, however, trapped within a
fixed notion of sovereignty as territory. The alternative offered in this Article
proposes a structural understanding of the sovereign form by suggesting that
sovereignty in the Westphalian phase, stimulated by the expansion of
capitalism on a national scale, was governed by underlying changes in the
83. See generally ROBERT JACKSON, QUASI STATES: SOVEREIONTY, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND
THE THIRD WORLD (1990).
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distribution of social power. Hence, it is the shift toward a global rather than
international economy that has set in motion significant changes in the form
of sovereignty. In a nutshell, the assertion is that form of sovereignty is not
fixed or immutable, but contingent on the underlying structures of economic
and social relations.
The erosion of the internal sovereignty of the State is perhaps the first
noticeable manifestation of the transformation of sovereignty. This is
particularly the case because a key feature of the Westphalian model (and
critical to the separation of the public and private in capitalism) is the internal
unity of the State, which in turn implies a monistic legal order. Increasingly,
globalization fragments this model of internal sovereignty by creating multiple
centers of governance around autonomous national and supranational
agencies. The emergent multilevel governance of the EU is a good exemplar
of this fragmentation of the internal sovereignty of the State. An important
ramification of this change in the form of internal sovereignty within the State
has been the emergence of a polycentric legal order, which has substantially
broken down the boundaries between international and domestic law. In fact,
it is these changes in the internal architecture of the State that have enabled
the nationalization of international law that are so critical to the constitution
of global systems of governance.
Externally these changes in the form of sovereignty have been evident in
the emergence of regulatory regimes such as the Basle Committee on capital
adequacy standards, all of which are governed by a network of regulatory
agencies. These networks consist of State or regulatory agencies that
represent their own specific institutional interests-which may be distinct
from other actors within the State-as well as those of their particular
constituencies. In short, these agencies or organizations, like independent
central banks, function at the boundary between the domestic and the global
economy. It is clear that the emergence of network governance following the
transformation of sovereignty has allowed States to regulate or govern
economic processes that are increasingly transnational. This, in turn, has
permitted the State through forms of network governance to close the gap
between economic and physical geography, so central to the new global
economy. In short, a major consequence of these forms of regulatory
governance is that they have enabled unbundling of territoriality and
sovereignty, which is essential for the constitution of the global economy.
These developments in international regulation, however, pose important
challenges for students of international relations and international law. The
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emergent new international regulatory order increasingly relies on the
formulation and implementation of broad-based regulatory standards rather
than on international rules. Moreover, there is a shift in emphasis from
enforcement to securing compliance through national regulatory agencies by
determining the general institutional or procedural framework under which
regulation occurs. But this proceduralism of the international regulatory State
cannot easily be accommodated within theories of international regimes
because these emergent regulatory mechanisms rearticulate 4 the international
sphere within the national domain. In other words, it breaks down the
boundary between the domestic and the international so central to our
entrenched understanding of international relations and law.
Much work remains to be done in clarifying the nature of the relationship
between the interdisciplinary boundaries of international relations and law.
However, this requires a fundamental rethinking of the basic assumptions
about sovereignty, which are constitutive of some of the most fundamental
distinctions and concepts of both disciplines. Understanding the fact that the
form of sovereignty is transformed by underlying changes in globalization of
economic relations is a first and important step in inaugurating a new and
innovative research agenda for the relationship between globalization and law.
84. See Ruggie, supra note 1, at 139-74, for an elaboration of this argument.

